This article engages critically with the normative framing of socially-engaged/collaborative art as a consensual/dissensual dichotomy. The main exponents of this position are Claire Bishop and Chantal Mouffe, and while there are important differences in how they theorise the relationship between art and politics, they share the view that consensual practices amount to a form of political abdication. This way of framing participatory practices that cross between art and activism gives rise to three significant problems however: one concerns the passive positioning of viewers/participants relative to the authorial autonomy of artist/artwork; the second concerns an inadequate understanding of power; and the third is an apparent inability to think consensus and dissensus together, i.e. as features of the same arena of practice. These issues are examined through reference to specific artistic practices, drawing on concepts from the literature on social and political power which are used in conjunction with Grant Kester's work on dialogical aesthetics. The article argues for a more open and dialogic approach to studying the relationship between politics and aesthetics, thereby avoiding the trap of using artistic practices as illustrative cases in support of conclusions that have been reached before the analysis has even commenced.
Introduction
As part of the annual Wiener Festwochen (Vienna Festival) were offered the chance of cash prizes, and for the overall winners -depending on the availability of willing volunteers -the possibility of Austrian citizenship through marriage.
Life inside the container was broadcast via the internet, with members of the public invited to vote on who should be evicted. At 8 p.m. each evening for six days, two asylum seekers were escorted from the container by burly men in black T-shirts bearing the word 'Security', and returned to the state-run detention centre to face deportation. Outside, atop the portakabins, Schlingensief used a megaphone to goad his audience. He dared the FPÖ to remove the banner; he toyed with the boundary between art and politics by declaring 'This is a performance! This is the absolute truth!'; he encouraged members of the public to air their views, and he provided running commentary on the evictions, making announcements such as 'It's a black man! Once again Austria has evicted a darkie!' (quoted in Bishop 2012, p. 43) . Less than two years later, asylum seekers interned at the Woomera Immigration
Reception and Processing Centre in the South Australian desert staged a hunger strike. The official title of the camp -framed as a facility that greets new arrivals (the sign attached to the perimeter fence included the word 'Welcome' in large bold font 3 ) -masks the privations endured by those who fall within the scope of Australia's policy of mandatory detention for non-citizens, and it was this harsh reality that saw some of the hunger-strikers adopt even more drastic measures to communicate their plight. One on the Iranians opened a vein and used his own blood to write 'freedom' in English and Farsi, in letters almost a metre high on the walls of one of the compound buildings. A group of seventy -children among themsewed their lips together in a gesture that caught the attention of the media and the public (Ahwan 2002; Marks 2002 ).
On the other side of the perimeter fence, protesters gathered in support of the hunger- The issue at the centre both of these events might be described, from Jacques Rancière (2010) , as a situation where some people -people who could (in altered circumstances) be anyone, and hence are representative of everyone -are positioned as a supplement to those who are counted among the population, and thus do not count in matters concerning the distribution of places, positions and entitlements. We also see something of how the interweaving of creative practice and communicative action can shape situations structured by relations of solidarity and enmity, cooperation and contestation.
The Woomera inmates were all but silenced by the physical remoteness of the camp, and also by legal instruments and administrative procedures that restrict the scope of what can legitimately be said and done. By sewing their mouths shut, the hunger-strikers transformed their refusal to eat into a more urgent and insistent message that entered into the public arena in the form of news articles and reports, internet posts, and email alerts, and though transmitted primarily in the form of written and spoken words, the power of this message lay in its visual impact. Even without evidence of what this self-inflicted violence actually looks like (a photograph for example), once it is known what these people did to themselves, it is all but impossible not to imagine their faces. This message, which was also an action that acted upon the actions of others, exhibits a striking aesthetic quality that works at the intersection of art and activism. Furthermore, in the way it shocks and disturbs, it is comparable to the tactics employed by artists working in the tradition of the avant-garde 5 .
Schlingensief's provocation is a case in point. As Claire Bishop points out, the 'shocking fact is that Schlingensief's container caused more public agitation and distress than the presence of a real deportation centre a few miles outside Vienna ' (2012, p. 44, original emphasis 'is again on the agenda and is hotly debated in many fora'. The key word here is 'again', because this is a question that runs like a red thread through a whole series of movements fusing cultural production to social reform and political renewal, from Futurism and Russian
Constructivism during the early decades of the twentieth century, through Dadaism, Surrealism, Fluxus, and Situationism. The most recent manifestation of this lineage has been described as a 'social' or 'collaborative turn' in art. This is a loosely configured umbrella term, and it incorporates a diverse body of currents and practices: relational aesthetics (Bourriaud 1998) , dialogical practice (Kester 2011) , social practice (Lind 2012) , and relational antagonism (Bishop 2004) . I think it would be a mistake -i.e. both futile and counterproductive -to try to reduce this diversity to some sort of singularity (another 'ism'), yet there are at least two core characteristics that make it possible to generalise from the particular, both of which are in evidence in the examples sketched above. One is an understanding of social life as a living texture of relations which has been formed and can be re-formed (Thompson 2012, p. 29) . Another is the conviction that this process of reformation can be orchestrated through collaborative and participatory undertakings: projects that fuse creative practice to communicative action. This however seems to mark the limit of what can be said without entering into the realm of dispute. In the next section I examine how this collaborative turn has been framed at the threshold of political theory and art criticism, focusing on the work of Chantal Mouffe and Claire Bishop, both of whom privilege dissensual art practices as a means of reinvigorating and radicalising democracy, which is apparently threatened by a pervasive (anti-)politics of 'consensus'. My argument is that this way of theorising the relationship between art and politics culminates in an unnecessarily restricted understanding of participation and also an inadequate understanding of power, and in the second part of the paper the focus shifts to projects that take us beyond the limitations of Mouffe and Bishop's dissensus/consensus dichotomy. Here will be seen evidence of how the art of democracy is practiced through the interweaving of cooperation and contestation, which combine as an agentic mode of constitutive power.
Agonistic Democracy and Relational Antagonism
Mouffe's theory of agonistic democracy is premised on the argument that there can be no social order or political unity of any kind which is not constituted by an 'outside' -an excluded surplus or excess which can never be fully incorporated, and which is both the product of past antagonisms and the source of further (potential) conflicts (2000, pp. 45-8; 2005, pp. 18-19) . This clearly overlaps with the reference to Rancière above concerning the uncounted, or those who have 'the part of no part ' (2010, p. 33) , and there also seems to be little doubt that Mouffe shares Rancière's disdain for consensus, which he equates with the 'shrinkage of political space ' (2010, p. 72) , and which Mouffe associates with a 'postpolitical Zeitgeist ' (2000; 2005, pp. 1-5) . In approaching Mouffe's position on the relationship between art and politics, I want to begin by briefly examining how she cleaves the problem of consensus so that it constitutes a threat which is anchored in two domains 6 .
On one side is what might be termed an empirical trend: the drift to the centre on the part of social democratic and labour parties, so that the political Left is seen to have formed an unacknowledged alliance with the Right in establishing the hegemony of neo-liberalism (2000, pp. 108-13) . On the other side is a trend in normative political theory, which goes by the name of 'deliberative democracy', and which posits rational deliberation and consensus as the means and ends of democratic politics (Mouffe 2000, pp. 45-9) . Mouffe seems determined to hold this trend in political theory to account, which is perhaps why Jürgen ' (2005, pp. 13-14) . Once this initial move is made, Mouffe deviates from Schmitt by insisting that the friend/enemy relation must be configured in such a way that it can accommodate 'the pluralism which is constitutive of modern democracy ' (2005, p. 14) .
Schmitt insisted on a fundamental opposition between liberalism and the democratic ideal of equality, with the latter -as already noted from Rancière, based on a decision that partitions those who are counted among 'us' from those who do not belong. For Schmitt, the relationship between liberalism and democracy is one of mutual negation: they cannot coexist. Mouffe however argues that this relationship should be understood as a contingent historical articulation -a fortuitous accident which has created a paradox. However, the 'democratic paradox' (Mouffe 2000) is not a puzzle to be solved so much as a way of staging agonistic political strategies. In other words, if opponents engage each other as adversaries rather than as enemies, then the democratic contest will prevail. This then is the defining feature of Mouffe's theory of 'agonism': a democracy where 'confrontation is kept open, power relations are always being put into question, and no victory can be final ' (2000, p. 15 ).
All of this foregrounds the role that Mouffe assigns to artistic activism as a way of staging counter-hegemonic interventions, and in her recent work she has begun to explore the ways in which a 'critical art' can 'contribute to the struggle against capitalist domination' Before commenting further on Jaar's intervention, I want to look at how Mouffe's negative framing of consensus is mirrored in the work of art critic Claire Bishop. Given that
Mouffe constructs her political theory against the foil of consensus, it might be expected that her views on the subversive efficacy of critical art would be contrasted against the artistic equivalent of Habermas' discourse ethics. Mouffe does in fact mention 'a marked tendency to replace aesthetic judgements with moral ones, pretending that these moral judgements are also political ones' (2013, p. 104), but she does not elaborate on this beyond remarking that this is further evidence of political abdication. Bishop however has engaged forcefully with this purported trend.
Bishop writes in defence of 'relational antagonism', which is a very specific understanding of aesthetics, and she opposes this to a consensual type of collaborative art that relinquishes authorial sovereignty and surrenders control to participants. According to Bishop, the latter is 'less interested in a relational aesthetic than in the creative rewards of collaborative activity ' (2006, p. 179, original emphasis) , and the shortcomings of this type of practice are deemed evident in the ways in which it helps to de-politicise spaces where politics might otherwise emerge. Bishop's point seems to be that it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish consensual social art from social work and soup kitchens, and this reflects the extent to which publically-funded community-based art has been deployed as an instrument of neo-liberal state reform (see Roche 2006 Columbus' discovery of the Americas, participants were paid to engage in group anal sex.
The acts of 'penetration' were scripted in accordance with eight possible permutations of male/female, male/male, white/black, so that the First Act depicts 'White race men penetrating white race women', followed by 'white race men penetrating white race men' (Second Act), 'white race men penetrating black race women' (Third Act), and so on 8 . The faces of the hired participants are digitally blurred, not to protect their anonymity but to depict them as dehumanized and modular workers, which is a theme that runs through much of Sierra's work. Los Penetrados is an allegory of conquest, domination and submission staged at the intersection of class, race and gender, but the acts performed for the camera are not simulations, and the work erases the distance between representation and reality.
In these public displays of exploitation, Sierra's intention seems to be one of causing maximum discomfort on the part of the viewer. It is Sierra's attitude, method, and mode of address that combine as an aesthetics of relational antagonism. What this entails, argues Bishop, is constructing 'highly authored situations that fuse social reality with carefully calculated artifice', thereby engineering an 'aesthetic impact' that fosters discomfort and frustration on the part of the viewer (Bishop 2006, pp. 181-3; 2004, pp. 77-9) . Relational antagonism creates a relay between aesthetics and politics, but it does so without dissolving the boundary between art and activism, and for
Bishop it is this type of practice that offers an antidote to relational art practices which she thinks are complicit in the depoliticising logic on consensus. Moreover, this acts as a catalyst in countering what she describes as 'well intentioned homilies that today pass for critical discourse on social collaboration ' (2006, p. 183; 2012, p. 40 ).
Here Bishop is not referring to any specific example of consensual-collaborative art, but to commentary upon such artworks, which she refers to as an 'ethical turn' in art criticism. The problem as she sees it is a growing aversion to 'art that might trouble or disturb its audience', which in practice means adopting an 'ethics of authorial renunciation ' (2006, p. 181) . In other words, the artist surrenders control over how the artwork is produced, encountered, and experienced, while curators and essayists facilitate and applaud these efforts at repairing the social bond.
In the way that the focus of her critique oscillates between collaborative artistic practices and the 'ethical turn' in art criticism, Bishop draws attention to the ways in which art itself is a type of raw material which is shaped and formed discursively. In other words, interpretation is a strategic and tactical game, so that irrespective of whether the work under discussion is defended or denounced, it is a means of promoting and defending a particular 91-3). The arena where this contest is staged is social consciousness, and the method might be called political ophthalmology. The objective is to correct the faulty vision of those among us who cannot see things 'as they really are', which is not a problem of 'false' consciousness so much as a failure to perceive the extent to which we are complicit in the reproduction of a system that prevents us from living more fulfilling lives. Everyone other than the critical artist and the critical theorist is apparently a dupe, which is why interventions staged by practitioners such as Jaar and Sierra step in to administer a dose of shock therapy to a public which has been incapacitated by the spectacle of mass-mediated entertainment and consumption (see Kester 2011, p. 178) . But what of those who actually experience this art?
Within the textual space of Mouffe and Bishop's analyses, the voices of anyone other than the artist and the analyst are muted to the point of near total silence.
Common to Jaar's use of public space and Sierra's gallery-based projects is the way that both artists attempt to script the response of the viewer (Kester 2011, p. 63) , so that art is used as a tool to act upon a generalised and homogenised spectator (Sierra) or public (Jaar).
Yet those who frequent the venues where Sierra exhibits are well versed in the aesthetics of disquiet and discomfort; in fact if they were not 'shocked' or 'disturbed' by the spectacle they would probably find cause for complaint. As argued by Grant Kester (2011), being made to feel 'uncomfortable' has long been an anticipated part of the avant-garde experience, as is being able to demonstrate virtuosity in decoding the work through conversation with others who have attained fluency in this particular language game. In the case of Jaar's more public intervention (and setting aside the possibility of his posters being interpreted as the lead-in to an advertising campaign), are we really to believe that this type of didactic art triggers discontent, or that people are incapable of desiring change without first being jolted into an awareness that change for the better is possible?
By insisting on such a definitive split between dissensus and consensus, Mouffe and (Bishop) , and neither is particularly useful as a way of dealing with concrete problems.
Furthermore, it seems to me that this dichotomy replicates a very conventional way of thinking about power. The next section begins by problematizing Mouffe and Bishop's aversion to power, following which I look at two examples of relational art that that shift the focus of analysis beyond their dissensus/consensus dichotomy.
The Constitutive Power of Collaborative Art
When examined analytically through the prism of power, 'consensus' is generally associated with power to and with as distinct from power over (Haugaard 2002; Haugaard and Ryan 2012) . For example, in Hannah Arendt's formulation, this is a mode of power that comes from acting in concert with others, which for Arendt is a condition of freedom (2005, p. 147).
However, this analytical purity is shunted aside by critical theorists working within the ambit of post-structuralism, who tend to be deeply suspicious of power to and with, because when people act in concert they also exercise power over each other, which may give rise to 
Dialogue Interactive Artists Association: Pilla Gudi (Temple for Children)
The Dialogue Interactive Artists Association (DIAA) is based in the city of Kondagaon, which is south of Raipur in the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh, and works primarily with Adivasi communities. The Adivasi are indigenous to the sub-continent, and are recognised by the Indian Constitution as a 'scheduled tribe' 9 , which entitles them to legal protection against discrimination as well as affording preferential treatment in accessing higher education (Kester 2011, p. 246) . Despite these constitutional protections, the Adivasi way of life is threatened in at least three ways: by the encroachment of timber and mining corporations; by Hindu nationalism, and in particular fundamentalist organisations bent on 'civilising the forest dwellers'; and by the Naxalites, who have been waging a Maoist-inspired insurgency against the Indian state for decades, which has ongoing implications for the safety and security of tribal communities. This is the context within which the DIAA operates, and An example of how this type of innovation is worked out in practice can be seen from the DIAA's Pilla Gudi (Children's Temple) project, which is modelled on the Adivasi institution of the Ghotul -a dormitory-style building where unmarried adolescents teach art and crafts, such as dance, song, and wood carving, to the younger children. The Ghotul also provides an opportunity for younger members of the village to form romantic and intimate relationships, which is encouraged by parents and Adivasi elders, but frowned upon by many Hindus, and there have been attempts to repress the Ghotul tradition (Kester 2011, p. 84-5) .
The Pilla Gudi was envisioned as a way of reinventing the Ghotul by creating a space where village children can gather, play, interact and educate each other. The first was designed by Rajkumar in 2001, and took its key architectural reference point from a renowned Adivasi temple known as the 'Mother Goddess' temple, which features carved deities built into the interior of the roof that look down upon the worshipers below. What Rajkumar did was alter the significance of the upward gaze of worship by removing its religious significance: he fitted mirrors to the interior ceiling of the Children's Temple, so that when the children look up they see their own reflections gazing back at them. Kester makes the point that this transforms the traditional 'performative submission' to symbols of metaphysical authority, so that agency and authority are attributed to the children themselves (2011, p. 85) . Importantly, the mirrors are not simply a passive adornment but are activated through workshops with the children, so that they function as a platform to explore ideas and themes relating to reflection and distortion, self and community 11 .
A second Pilla Gudi was created by Navjot Altaf, and was designed as an open-air space for performance and discussion. The design again inverted the architecture of a nearby temple, this time by burying a concave dome in the ground, which was then filled with sand to serve as a stage. The submerged dome is surrounded by a circular concrete seating structure which is deliberately fractured in one section. Titled 12 + 1 = 13 (Hence it is not a Circle), the break in the circle symbolises a type of interruption to the cyclical flow of village life, and whoever occupies this fractured space is expected to introduce questions for discussion or suggest activities for the group (Kester 2011, p. 86) . Finally, a third Pilla Gudi was designed collaboratively, and this one is of particular significance because its design reflects the wishes of the children themselves. The children envisioned a space that would be sited on the periphery of the DIAA compound, turned away from the other DIAA buildings, and thus removed from adult scrutiny. The children also produced drawings of a building that would be both a playground and a meeting place, and where the space of interaction would extend from the ground to the roof of the structure itself (Figure 4 ). Kester sees this as being continuous with the first Pilla Gudi, in that both 'invert the traditional architectural syntax', so that in the first Temple, 'ceiling-as-heaven becomes ceiling-as-mirror', while in the third, 'roof-as-shelter becomes roof-as-playground'. Kester also makes the point that all three temples 'literalise the child's agency, their capacity to remake and reinvent the world, to act rather than being acted upon ' (2011, p. 86) . Although Kester does not use the concept of power in his analysis, he nevertheless seems to equate the Pilla Gudi project with empowerment. But it would be a mistake to assume that empowerment is beyond reproach, or that good intentions obviate the need for critical reflection. The mirrored ceiling, the twelfth seat, and the roof-as-playground are unobtrusive pedagogical techniques, and each in its own way promotes a set of values:
autonomy, equality of status, and mutuality founded on the principle of equal moral worth.
By displacing the authority of religion, these architectural innovations prompt children to take critical distance from aspects of Adivasi culture, which also equips them to withstand the assimilatory pressure of Hindu nationalism, which is in effect a non-antagonistic mode of dissensus. The Pilla Gudi is in fact a technology of government -a way of acting upon the children's capacity for action (Foucault 2007 ) -and in this sense is a species of power over.
This is not to suggest that the children are coerced; rather it is an observation that emplaces the DIAA's work with children within the historical arc of practices that seek to orchestrate social change and cultural renewal by training and educating children (see Ryan 2015 Ryan , 2008 .
The key to this, or so I would argue, is a mode of constitutive power that operates through subjectivation. This is also evident in a very different example of dialogical aesthetics, Park Fiction, which shifts the scale of analysis from the micro-politics of the DIAA's collaborative practice, to collaborative work that operates at the macro-political level of state institutions and social formations (Kester 2011, p. 202) .
Park Fiction/Gezi Park Hamburg
Kester traces the origins of Park Fiction to 1981 12 . It was at this time that squatters began to occupy vacant city-owned buildings along the harbour-front of St. Pauli Hafenstraße in
Hamburg, adjacent to the city's notorious Reeperbahn red-light district. By 1987, at which time the squatters had established a school, day-care, café, library, legal aid clinic, and pirate radio station, the city was attempting to evict them. What began as forced evictions and intimidation tactics -arbitrary arrests and interruptions to the electricity supply -rapidly escalated, with squatters erecting barricades and engaging in street battles with police (Schäfer 2004, p. 39; Kester 2011, pp. 199-200) . The violence gradually abated, and in 1996 a compromise was reached when the remaining squatters were offered a deal allowing them to purchase a block of occupied buildings for one-third of the market value. But a new wave of struggle was already unfolding, triggered by a process of gentrification, and in particular a planned development project that would have enclosed the Hafenstraße behind a wall of high-rise office buildings and apartments, thereby blocking access to the waterfront. In organising to resist the proposed development, a group of residents formed the Harbour Edge Association (HEA). In his reflections of this early phase of Park Fiction, the artist Christoph Schäfer (2004, p. 42) presents it as a continuation of the Hafenstraße squats, but after a full year of 'demanding a park' came the realisation that 'the classic forms of lobbying were about to lead to a dead-end', and this marked a turning point. The Hafenstraße 'barricade days' are deeply embedded in the local social consciousness, and the HEA had reactivated this symbolic resource in a way that was continuous with the tactics and strategies deployed over the previous decade. But as Schäfer points out, once it became apparent that the context had changed, that 'eighties-style militant activism had lost its momentum', that 'the squat had been legalised', and that 'the former fighters had retreated into their houses' so that 'private had become private again', then it became apparent that a new method would have to be created in order to 'open public space as a field of dispute' (cited in Kester 2011, p. 202) .
The new method fused art and activism, and it took the form of a parallel planning process that was to serve as a vehicle for negotiations between the Park Fiction collective and the formal planning authorities, thus avoiding 'the trap of taking the "legal" bureaucratic path' (Schäfer 2004, p. 44) . The parallel process was conceptualised as a 'platform of exchange', enabling people from a variety of 'cultural fields' -musicians, artists, café owners, squatters, priests, teachers, children -to participate in a sustained process of dialogue and mutual learning (Park Fiction 2013) . Against a strictly textual mode of address, such as distributing information through leaflets and posters, Park Fiction acquired an old shipping container and transformed it into a Planning Container, which was equipped with 'tools' designed to promote accessibility and playfulness, including a 'modelling clay office', a 'telephone hotline for people who get inspired late at night', 'an instant camera to capture ideas', and 'game boards' designed to generate possibilities and give expression to desires (Park Fiction 2013) . The theme of desire, which reflects the influence of Situationist texts (Schäfer 2004, p. 42) , is at the heart of Park Fiction, which is both a movement framed as a Though heavily used by children, skateboarders, musicians, dog-walkers, and courting couples, the park is much more than an amenity. It is also hugely symbolic in that this is a patch of land which has been claimed as a public space where people can assemble and associate, not just for the purpose of leisure, but also to organise for collective action. It (Kester 2011, pp. 209-10) . The point to be taken from this example of dialogical practice is that it exceeds the simple dichotomy between consensus and dissensus. Park Fiction exists not solely as a result of organised resistance to power as such, but because of the interweaving of cooperation and contestation, which in this case has been enacted through a complex web of interaction that zigzags across the boundaries of power to, with, and over. As with DIAA'a work in Kondagaon, this is again an example of how constitutive power operates at the threshold between the poles of Mouffe and Bishop's dichotomy, and it is also an example of how subjectivation is practised.
The Art of Democracy
Notwithstanding the many differences that distinguish the collaborative practices of the DIAA and Park Fiction, Kester identifies a number of common characteristics: both are premised on durational interaction rather than rupture; both problematize the authorial status of the artist by engaging in 'improvisationally responsive' rather than 'scripted' relations among participants, and in comparison to Bishop's aesthetics of antagonism, both rely on more conciliatory strategies in attempting to transform the consciousness of participants, thereby generating possibilities for new subjectivities, insights, and 'modes of being-together'
to emerge (Kester 2011, pp. 65, 76, 101-5 (Kester 2012, p. 159) .
In Habermas' ideal speech situation, participants working towards shared understanding and mutual agreement may be swayed by the unforced force of the better argument, but there is no indication that this entails more than a degree of cognitive revision on the part of the subject. What Kester is interested in is the extent to which subjectivity itself is 'formed through discourse and inter-subjective exchange ' (2012, p. 159) . This is really the key insight that I am attempting to elucidate here: at the conceptual level this concerns the relation between constitutive power and subjectivation, while at the level of practice it operates as a relay between consensus and dissensus.
Common to the micro-politics of the Pilla Gudi and the macro-politics of Park Fiction is a type of practice that reconstitutes relations of power through a process of subjectivation, yet this does not wholly conform to what are arguably the most influential analytical renderings of this process, certainly among post-structuralists, i.e. in the work of Foucault and Rancière. In Foucault's analyses we see how the subject is formed through relational practices and technologies which are constituted by regimes of truth, and though subjectivation is linked to technologies of the self in his later work, so that the subject practices freedom by transfiguring the present, in much of Foucault's writings the question of subjectivation pivots around the problem of domination (Foucault 1997a (Foucault , 1997b . Neither is the constitutive power of dialogic aesthetics reducible to the subjectivation (la subjectivation) of Rancière, which is the name he uses for episodes whereby those who are rendered invisible and inaudible by the existing order succeed in 'undoing the formatting of reality' by attempting to right a wrong through acts of 'disidentification or declassification ' (1992; 2004, p. 65) . What makes this a uniquely political act in Rancière's view is that it activates the ineradicable kernel of the political: we are all equal (Rockhill 2004, p. 13 ). Foucault's genealogical method examines subjectivation as a 'positive' or constitutive mode of power which, in terms of effects, is more or less equivalent to power over, though he also allows for the possibility of reducing the extent and intensity of domination through a critically informed understanding of how the subject is formed. For Rancière, subjectivation is first and foremost a dissensual bid for emancipation, which is possible only if and when the uncounted move against the grain of the regime of the sensible, or the order of 'police', which is the source of power over. The constitutive power of the DIAA and Park Fiction, of Schlingensief's Bitte Liebt Österreich, and also the actions of those on both sides of the fence as the Woomera detention centre in 2002, is all of this and more: it is deeply agentic; it is enacted by subjects who name themselves through participation in collaborative/dialogic practices and processes; and it is (trans)formative at the level of both subject and context. In addition, this mode of subjectivation is constituted in contexts shaped by the interlacing of conflictual and consensual power relations, but the precise configuration of power cannot be ascertained without a deep understanding of the context in question, which is why collaboration that fuses art to activism necessitates -as noted by Brian Holmes (2012, pp. 78-9 ) -a 'tight articulation' of analytical and aesthetic concerns, or a 'broad division of cultural labour', which entails analysing the complexity of social phenomena, disseminating the results of analysis through expressive practices, and producing an awareness that can serve a catalyst for transformative action.
If the art of democracy is restricted to a politics of dissensus, then it omits the constitutive power produced through collaborative/dialogic practice, which is eclipsed by a hyper-normative analysis which seems unwilling to question its own core presuppositions.
The problem with such an approach is that it uses relational practices as illustrative cases in support of conclusions that have been reached before the analysis has even commenced. An alternative strategy is to begin from practice itself, using critical theory as a conceptual toolbox rather than as a rigid template, which might then afford the opportunity of learning from practitioners who are currently doing the work that Mouffe envisions: creating new subjectivities, and hence also new social forms. Moreover, if the goal is to avoid violent antagonisms of a Schmittian variety, then can we really afford to disqualify collaborative practices on the grounds that these are not sufficiently agonistic or disruptive? 4 The concept of communicative action is most closely associated with the work of Jürgen Habermas (1984 Habermas ( , 1987 . Here I am using this as a normatively-neutral concept in the tradition of speech act theory (Austin 1962) , and thus deviating from Habermas' usage, which is discussed briefly below.
Notes

